DPD-5073-61

15 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT

: CIA/Department of Defense Liaison

- 1. Per your request for a comment by DPD in reference to the desired line of command or liaison with the Department of Defense, I would like to make the following comments.
- 2. Reviewing our past dealings with the Department of Defense, I would say the problem area that has caused us the greatest concern, and, in turn, delays in getting on with a project, is the manner in which decisions made at a high level (such as the 5412 Group) are passed to the supporting DOD element. The best illustrative example of this particular problem was demonstrated during the Cuban operation when the Air Force, Navy or Army support representative would question our requirements with such comments as, "Who authorized this?"; "We don't think this to be satisfactory to the Air Force"; "We will have to take this under consideration"; etc. This attitude reflected a misunderstanding or disregard for a policy decision that had been resolved at the highest level. This, in turn, induced the Agency to make compromises rather than take on the delay and unpleasant experience of having to defend a foregone decision which we believed was clearly established. Once the Service decision to assist us was made, the support was usually adequate.
- 3. In recommending a remedy to overcome this difficulty, the following considerations should be paramount. There should be one focal point (and, in this case, I am hoping it will be General Lansdale), and this should be a person as close as possible to the policy-making level, thus being cognizant of the decisions made at that level and also completely familiar with the parameters of those decisions. The person having this knowledge would be able to clearly write directives to the supporting Service concerned, thereby reducing the problem of the lower ILLEGIB

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echelon individual having to interpret what is required. In discussing this problem early this year with Air Force representatives, they indicated that many of the difficulties in supporting the Agency stem from not knowing or being given direction from a high level in DOD as to what is required. This reaffirms what I have stated above. With the focal point being at a Deputy Secretary level, and, again, fully knowledgeable of what the project objective is. I believe the Services can proceed in supporting the Agency without the delays and studies which they felt necessary in the past. However, if there should arise a point of controversy, it can be referred directly to the focal point who would be knowledgeable of what is required and capable of interpreting the question.

4. In reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this is a matter for General Lansdale's office; however, copies of whatever directives are sent to the various Services could be made available to the JCS for their information and, of course, any comments they may have can be arbitrated by the office supporting Agency projects. A lesser recommendation, but an important one, is that whoever the DOD individual may be who is charged with fulfilling the support role in our joint Government endeavors, he should be imbued with the philosophy that his value is reflected through his capability to support CIA operations and that his attitude must be an affirmative one in this context.

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Acting Chief, DPD-DD/P

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